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LAW, LEGITIMACY AND COERCION:
ONE VIEW FROM LAW AND ECONOMICS
PAUL H. BRIETZKE*
Coercion' and legitimacy2 are pivotal and problematic concepts, which too
Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. While I am extremely grateful to Larry
Albrecht, Robert Marx Denton, Jack Hiller, Ken Klein, Dave Myers, Fran Rushnok, Peter
Venturelli, Thomas Wartenberg, and Tim Watts for their help in preparing this article, the
responsibility for errors is mine. Presented at the Law and Legitimation of Violence Conference,
Buffalo, New York, March 16-18, 1989.
1. Philosophers and theologians properly draw distinctions between violence and a broader
coercion. But much in the social sciences suggests that such a distinction is problematic and often
irrelevant. For example, Liaszos asks sociologists and decisionmakers to take account of the forms
of a "covert institutional violence": poverty, war, racism, sexism, and some corporate outcomes -
tax breaks, pollution, bored workers in dead-end jobs, and shoddy goods at fixed prices. A.
Liaszos, The Poverty of the Sociology of Deviance: Nuts, Sluts and 'Preverts', in THEORIES OF
DEVIANCE 330, 339-40 (2d ed., S. Traub & C. Little, eds. 1980). According to Unger, market
institutions combine coercive and consensual elements, which enable some to shape the activities of
others. R. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND TASK 60 (1987). Cassese suggests that
international law authorizes those uses of coercion which it cannot restrain. This exceedingly
imperfect channeling of coercion is one result of revulsion over Nazi concentration camps and the
atom bombs dropped on Japan. A. CASSESE, VIOLENCE AND LAW IN THE MODERN AGE 3, 6, 30,
46 (1988).
This is not to say that coercion is the only or even the major resource in use: "No
government has the resources to compel citizens to do what, on a large scale, they are determined
not to do.... A university campus garrisoned by police is incapable of carrying on its normal
educational functions." W. CHAMBuss & R. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER AND POWER 351 (1971).
Governmental coercion is less effective than most theorists assume, given the relatively small share
of production that even the most authoritarian of regimes can harness for coercive purposes.
Coercion is expensive to organize, chokes the energies of those using it, and stems the supply of
information essential to a rational decisionmaking. Nevertheless, there is a strong case for using
coercion strategically and in small doses to overcome major development bottlenecks (in the Third
World and elsewhere), to raise levels of social discipline, and to strengthen the State. See infra
notes 35-46 and accompanying text. This may shock some jurists and philosophers, but a reluctance
to use coercion when necessary helps to perpetuate the "functioning anarchy" of a political
underdevelopment and the legal fiction that states of emergency are temporary measures taken under
extraordinary circumstances. See D. AFTER, POLITICAL CHANGE 116 (1973); B. MOORE, SOCIAL
ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 7, 21 (1973); and E. SCHUR, LAW AND SOcIETY 59
(1968). Nonet and Selznick add that the legal order is not repressive if coercion is restrained: if
it is used with discrimination where viable alternatives are not available, if it is tailored to the harm
at issue, and if the subject has an opportunity to protect his interests. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK,
LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 31 (1978).
A law and economics of coercion has not yet been developed in any rigorous way. But Robert
Lee Hale addressed the subject long ago: "coercive restrictions are bound to affect the distribution
of income and the direction of economic activities...." Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic
Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 470, 474, 478 (1923). There is a reluctance among lawyers to address
coercion because "some of the grosser forms of private coercion are illegal, and the undoubtedly
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often serve as deus ex machinae in sociolegal analysis. Law and economics has
some, perhaps many, interesting things to say about these concepts. A
"praxiology," law and economics is a formal theory that claims to explain all
of purposive activity. It passes the threshold test of a good "fit" between
theoretical principles and actual outcomes.3  Unfortunately, economists
coercive character of the pressure exerted by the property-owner is disguised. .. .Income is the price
paid for not using one's coercive weapons.. .[, such as] the power to withhold one's labor." Id.
Hale also addressed the doctrine of duress, a basis for a court refusing to enforce a contract. He
quotes from an English case, R. v. Denyer (1926) 2 K.B. 258, which describes the crime of
blackmail: "A person has no right to demand money ... as a price of abstaining from inflicting
unpleasant consequences upon a man." This standard would, Hale argues, make a felony out of
every sale of property or acceptance of a salary. Hale goes on to develop an explicit conflict model
of contracts and of law and economics generally. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. So1. 470 (1943). See infra note 16 and accompanying text. Consent
to a bargain involves yielding to the threats of others, and freedom of contract - and other freedoms
as well - are really power relationships. The holder of a contract, property, or other similar right,
gets to exert a power delegated by the sovereign.
2. "Legitimacy" connotes a faith or trust in individuals, procedures, and/or organizations. It
denotes the ability to make people think that a claim to obedience is self-evident, and it is frequently
produced by processes of justification and excuse. See infra note 5. The need for legitimacy
reflects the fact that all organizations are vulnerable in varying degrees. Legitimacy is a resource
in its own right; to the extent that it exists, fewer of the other types of resources used to secure
compliance with public and private decisions need be deployed. As Barnes notes, sophisticated
instruments lubricate elaborate transactions; great "amounts of symbolic power may be underpinned
with but a small quantity of coercive resources." B. BARNES, THE NATURE OF POWER 15 (1988).
But just as a decreased public confidence forces recourse to payments in gold, so too does it force
the use of direct coercion and violence. Id. at 16.
In the West, legitimacy often rests on consent: the majority's acquiescence in major policies
and the constitution. Consent has the compelling quality of authority; trust is built up bit by bit,
thereby strengthening bonds between government and the governed. Such a legitimacy rests on
shared (but often very general) values and understandings. Allegiance to these (at least among elites)
makes life within society or an organization possible, and it precedes more specific choices.
American notions of legitimacy seem to rest on a popular sovereignty, impartiality, equal
opportunity and social mobility, and/or economic growth. But crises and conflicts, such as the one
between modernist culture and the discipline required by capitalist production, constantly call
obligation and obedience into question. See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text. Other sources
of legitimacy include charisma (e.g., Mao's), tradition (e.g., for Saudi princes), and the wise
exercise of a discretion unfettered by law (e.g., Plato's philosopher-king). Even a crude legitimation
raises key questions: Quo warranto?, Who monitors the monitors? See R. DAHRENDORF, CLASS
AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 200 (1959); S. FINER, THE MAN ON HORSEBACK
175 (1975); J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS XIV, 7-8 (1976); R. JACKSON & M. STEIN,
ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 206 (1971); G. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE 57 (1966); P.
NONET & P. SELZNICK, supra note 1; Raz, Government by Consent, in AUTHORITY REVISITED 76,
90, 106 (1987) [hereinafter, Government by Consent]; E. SCHUR, supra note I, at 85; R. UNGER,
LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 30-31 (1976); Hettne, Transcending the European Model of Peace and
Development, 10 ALTERNATIVES 453, 467 (1985). See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
3. R. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 284-86 (1986); M. GODELIER, RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY IN ECONOMICS 12-13 (1972). See generally Bietzke, Another Law and Economics,
9 RES. IN ECON. 57 (1986); Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance, 54 GEO. L.J. 159 (1986)
(general discussion of law and economics). Some may prefer Dworkin's more critical and
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sometimes use bellicose language and overdrawn analyses, perhaps to provoke
legal philosophers and sociologists into abandoning their citadels and starting
afresh from different first principles. When jurisprudes and sociologists reply
in kind, debates grow inefficient; they generate more heat than light. My
purpose is to seek out a common ground, or at least a more neutral territory, for
the pursuit of interdisciplinary insights.
I. A BASIC "MODEL"
One definition of their craft has economists studying choice in the allocation
and aggregation of scarce resources, so as to produce and distribute outcomes:
goods, services, and other resources, which are then subject to tradeoffs.4
Choice is seen to be governed by the availability of the various resources and
by the cost-benefit analyses carried out by the rational-by-definition individuals
philosophical treatment: R. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986). Economists do not always agree
among themselves, of course. Calabresi and Melamid argue: "The thief not only harms the victim,
he undermines rules and distinctions (between, e.g., property rules and liability rules) of significance
beyond the specific case." Posner, on the other hand, argues that "the criminal sanction is simply
a method of pricing conduct" which "imposes additional costs ... to limit that conduct to the efficient
level." Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, quoting Posner in CRIMINAL JUSTICE 289 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1985). Economists seldom make their assumptions explicit, yet those
of one analyst frequently conflict with those of another. Analytical outcomes also differ, and I thus
call my article "One View ... " rather than "The View ... ". A strict Chicago School approach
might be better titled "The Coercion of Law and Economics".
Law and economics is a species of positivism which is surprisingly incongruous with a legal
positivism, and which is vulnerable to many of the criticisms of a philosophical positivism. Despite
(or perhaps because of) its ostensible positivism, much law and economics scholarship exists to
produce political abstractions: analyses which systematically prefer economic freedoms defined in
particular ways. Gunnar Myrdal argues that economic "liberals" set "out to isolate an 'economic'
factor in political life" in order to give "a scientific appearance to an individualist, anti-
interventionist prejudice." Myrdal, Implicit Values in Economics, in THE POITICAL ELEMENT IN
THE DEvELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 250 (D. Hausman ed. 1954). Reder adds some
criticisms: Chicago School economics assumptions and concepts form a rather murky and
tautologous epistemology, they describe rather than explain events, they tempt analysts to be
dogmatic, and they do not consistently account for the invisible hand of power that lies underneath
the Invisible Hand of market processes. Reder, Chicago Economics, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1
(1982). 1 will seek to minimize such defects, but I cannot pretend to eliminate them or to avoid
introducing some other defects into my analyses. But see Brietzke, Another Law and Economics,
9 RES. L. & ECON. 57 (1986), for some justifications of my approach.
4. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 5 (6th ed. 1964); Posner, supra note 3.
5. Maurice Allais, the 1988 Nobel laureate in economics, defines economic rationality as the
pursuit of mutually coherent ends by appropriate means. M. GODELIER, RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY IN ECONOMICS 12 (1972) (citing Allais). But this often becomes a tautology;
rationality turns out to consist of what people actually do - such as smoking cigarettes. Individuals'
profit maximization is the economic rationality characteristic of capitalism. This rationality also
leads to "a particular way of functioning of the family, the state, etc." Id. at 268. In other societies
or at other times, economic rationality is quite different: e.g., the prodigality of potlatch contests,
which produce prestige and security for the giver. Id. See Staniskis, Martial Law in Poland, 54
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and (the focus of this article) organizations making the choices. If we want to
reduce the level of violence in society, many economists would have us working
to increase the perceived costs or decrease the perceived benefits of using
violence, to delegitimate organizations advocating violence, and/or to deprive
such organizations of some other key resource. A study of the phenomena of
choice fosters a "policy" orientation, a desire to evaluate actual and potential
choices and constraints on choice. This desire is captured in Holmes'6 Realist
view of law as influenced by the "felt necessities of the time."
Some economists restrict their analyses to the five conventional resources:
land, labor, capital, technology, and entrepreneurship. But richer analyses,
particularly of political behavior, result when we incorporate five more
resources: coercion, law, legitimacy, ideology,7 and bureaucratic capacity.'
TELOS 87, 90-91 (1982-83) (discussed infra at note 11 and accompanying text). The law and
economics literature thus sees criminals as displaying a "bounded rationality", as choosing
rationally in the face of uncertain costs and benefits. Kievorick, supra note 3.
Cost-benefit analyses often clarify policy problems and solutions. See E.J. MISHAN, COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1976). But such analyses are sometimes not feasible or moral: "You can't
really trade off an Indian child's education with the future of the whooping crane." A. MELTSNER,
POuCY ANALYSTS IN THE BUREAUCRACY 276 (1976) quoting former U.S. Secretary of the Interior
Udall.
6. W. CHAMBLISS AND R. SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 49.
7. See, e.g., P. MCAUSLAN, LAND, LAW AND PLANNING (1975); Ackerman, Discovering the
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1054 (1984) (tacit ideological presuppositions construct legal
reality); Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277 (1984). In
comparison, ostensibly positivist economists are not as active in analyzing the ideological nature of
their craft. But see H. KATOUZIAN, IDEOLOGY AND METHOD IN ECONOMICS (1980); SUTTON, THE
AMERICAN BUSINESS CREED (1956); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
MGT. Sci. 3 (1971). "Ideology" has no specific referent, and it thus combines so readily with other
resources that its effect on the production and distribution of outcomes is often difficult to detect.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the "end of ideology" was confidently proclaimed for Americans;
these analyses later became part of the ideology called neo-conservativism. Academic interest in
ideology was revived after its blatant use over Vietnam, over dividing up a slowly-growing economic
pie, and in a racial, ethnic, and sexual politics. Blatantly monocausal explanations are still
(properly) frowned upon however, and many persist in regarding an ideology as unsavory: I have
a political philosophy, you have opinions, and they have ideologies.
Ideology is present every time a policy problem is solved or sidetracked, especially when the
complexity of a problem forces recourse to an intuition which must then be rationalized. Ideology
becomes a systematic way of seeing - and not seeing - problems. As Murphy and Tanenhaus put
it, "wants - usually expressed as needs - do shape power, if not authority." See W. MURPHY & J.
TANENHAUS, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 643 (1977). The
best example is: "What is good for General Motors is good for the country." Edelman traces one
relationship between ideology and coercion: "The employment of language to sanctify action is
exactly what makes politics different from other methods of allocating values.... Force signals
weakness in politics, as rape does in sex." M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 114
(1964). Fanon's ideology of the "cleansing" effect of violence is the counter-example. F. FANON,
THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (C. Farmington trans. 1965).
Law and ideology are difficult to distinguish because they interpenetrate at so many crucial
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 [1991], Art. 2
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Some or all of these ten resources are regularly assembled in various
combinations called production and distribution functions. 9 An examination of
why some resources happen to be available to particular organizations, and of
why the resources are allocated and aggregated in some ways rather than others,
helps to answer Harold Lasswell's "political questions": Who gets what, when,
where, and, above all, why?'0
Within limits, the ten resources can be made to substitute for each other.
Just as capital can substitute for labor (more machines mean fewer employees),
an order regarded as legitimate needs less coercion to make it effective. Israeli
jets attack Palestinian positions in Lebanon on Israel's election day, apparently
in a blatant attempt to legitimate the Likud Party's militance that benefits the
military. For Staniszkis, violence became a means of production in a Poland
under martial law." A ritualized neo-Stalinist ideology was produced in futile
attempts to conceal violations of a sacred Marxist canon: the military must be
kept out of politics. An entrepreneur, Henry Ford or Franklin Roosevelt,
creates organizations that reinvest in a life and power (a bureaucratic capacity)
of their own, so that they continue to produce and distribute outcomes long after
the death of their creator. Similarly, most Third World governments invest
heavily in the "penetration" of bureaucratic capacity into a vast rural outback
and satrapies of urban opposition. The aims are to extend the reach of state law
junctures. Both treat the way power is exercised; both screen information for, and offer security
to, those who are affected; both provide the means to polarize arguments, dazzle and divide
opponents, and cloak shabby actions; and both facilitate a tighter organization around common
interests - often enhancing a bureaucratic capacity in the process. Law and ideology alike influence
and are influenced by values. Both attempt to bridge Hume's "is' and "ought" with what "can"
be done, a possibility ignored by legal and economic positivists. In economics, values are often
analyzed as private and subjective utilities. Weisskopf describes the ideological imperative of
economic growth, which favors big business, labor, and government and which is bolstered by a no-
longer-accurate free enterprise ideology; the visible hand of these bureaucracies has replaced the
Invisible Hand. Weisskopf, The Moral Predicament of the Market Economy, in G. DWORKIN, G.
BERMONT, & P. BROWN, MARKETS AND MORALS 33, 39-40 (1977).
8. Brietzke, The "Seamy Underside" of Constitutional Law, 8 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
J. 1, 22 n.63, 25-26 (1985) [hereinafter Brietzke, The Seamy Underside].
9. While economic resources are typically seen as factors of production and political resources
as factors of distribution or redistribution, these processes so interpenetrate as to become
indistinguishable. Most individuals and organizations take part in both production and distribution,
having at their disposal both incomes (including incomes imputed to those living at a subsistence)
and an (often limited) capacity to grant or withhold political participation and loyalty. Production
and distribution procure the sum total of the means of existence and enjoyment. The key to
economic rationality is the freedom to recombine and renew in pursuit of these means. See M.
GODEUER, supra note 3, at 263; P. MERKL, MODERN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 306 (1970); Tangri,
Economics Sstema and Economic Efficiency, in G. NESS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 423, 430 (1970); R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 59.
10. H. LASWELL, PoLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (1936).
11. Staniskis, supra note 5, at 89-91, 97-98.
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and order and, through more plausible claims to obedience, to lay the
foundations for governmental legitimacy. But as penetration grows apace, the
public perceives the need for legal protections against, for example, the ruthless
Swedish tax collector. She perhaps embodies Max Weber's "legal-rational
legitimacy," an Idealist combination of coercion, law, legitimacy, ideology, and
bureaucratic capacity if ever there was one. These and other examples illustrate
Black's first dictum that law varies inversely with other social controls.' 2
Like law, economics tries to focus our attention on outcomes, on what
actually happens rather than on what leaders or the social scientists studying
them say should happen." Behavior is constantly channelled away from
randomness and toward particular expected outcomes, through complex systems
of rewards (for conformity) and punishments (for deviance). 4 These rewards
and punishments are factored into the cost-benefit calculus of the actors, but the
influence of these sanctions is often marginal in comparison with other costs and
benefits.
Ford produces cars, of course, but it also produces dividends and capital
gains for shareholders, the wealth and power of senior managers, and many
other things as well. Similarly, the Palestinian Liberation Organization seeks
to produce a future Palestinian homeland, increased power and security for
Yassar Arafat and other top leaders, quasi-legitimate opportunities to act out
violent impulses, etc. Careful study of such outcomes would show that the
economists' assumption of a scarcity of resources is extremely plausible; no
organization can produce and distribute as many diverse outcomes as it would
like. Organizations are thus forced to make tradeoffs. The ways tradeoffs are
made under conditions of scarcity provide important clues about the nature of
an organization's goals and cost-benefit analyses, and about how these might be
influenced by legal and other policies.
Within limits, Ford will trade off cars and shareholder interests to attain
management interests, since top management makes the decisions within a tight
hierarchy and subject to little real accountability. Likewise, we can predict that
the advent of a Palestinian homeland would not cause the PLO to disband. It
12. D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 6 (1976).
13. See Brietzke, The Seamy Underside, supra note 8, at 5-6. According to Karl Llewellyn:
"Before rules, were facts; in the beginning was not a Word, but a doing", and beyond rules may
lie effects. W. CHAMBUSS & R. SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 50, quoting Llewellyn. Talk is
(relatively) cheap, even when it takes the resource-form of ideology. The actual production and
distribution of outcomes is very different from merely thinking and talking about them. As Portia
observed: "If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches and
poor men's cottages prince's palaces." Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, I, ii, 13.
14. See Dahrendorf, Norms and Inequality, in LAW AND SOCIETY 298 (C. Campbell& P. Wiles
eds. 1979).
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would likely switch to producing an expanded governance and perhaps an
expanded territory, possibly in a violent way. Ideology frequently plays an
important role in selecting organizational goals (dictated by images of a desired
future), in the means for producing these goals (means constrained by past
outcomes), and in social science evaluations of means and ends. 5 In a Poland
under martial law, the elite owned the means of production. But instead of
using them for purposes of an "accumulation," the goal was to produce a
"totalitarian Utopia": "the subjugation of individuals to the 'community', i.e.,
to the State." Where this rationality conflicted with an "economic rationality,"
the latter was shoved aside "through the elimination of self-regulating
mechanisms and the substitutions of economic categories invented by some
administrators." 6 Solidarity's tactics may thus have had little effect on the
new Polish elite, which is less competent in executing tradeoffs, that is, at
exchanging social welfare benefits for revenue and loyalty from the public. 7
II. THE ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION
The Polish example reminds us that rationality frequently undergoes a sea-
change when individuals act together in a group. Gustav Le Bon found that
people lost their critical and moral standards when they joined "mobs" during
the French Revolution.' They engaged in violence and other illegal acts,
something that allegedly happened to top Ford executives as well. Deciding not
to redesign the Pinto, which was known to explode when struck hard from
behind, Ford executives apparently chose to kill numbers of people, something
they would presumably not choose to do in their private capacities. (Sending
these executives to jail would offer a stronger deterrent than does punishing the
corporation. Such a punishment is usually visited on shareholders and
consumers, and it is easily rationalized under a managerial ideology about the
inability to "get government off our backs.")
Clearly, an organizational rationality, saving money by paying off on
lawsuits rather than redesigning the Pinto, need not be the simple sum of its
members' or leaders' rationalities. Yet many economists see only the cool
calculations of an individual self-interest, based on copious and reliable
information, on risk aversion, and on a severely limited altruism devoid of a
true believership. If this were the case, few or none would ever voluntarily die
for cause or country. By way of contrast, Max Weber's organizational
rationality has each person applying specialized means instrumentally, within a
15. M. GODEUIER, supra note 3, at 9, 236.
16. See Staniskis, supra note 5, at 89-90.
17. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 5, 8.
18. G. LE BON, THE CROWD (1969).
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hierarchy devoted to the continuous pursuit of goals bounded by rules. 9 But
in the real world, finding optimal production and distribution functions involves
a great deal of experimentation; information and competence are scarce and
expectations are uncertain. (These variables can be manipulated through legal
and other policies to influence organizational behavior.) A raison de groupe,
a rough midpoint between a private morality and Machiavelli's political morality
of raison d'tat, is often calibrated carefully to elicit organization-favoring
outcomes from "insiders." These insiders can take refuge in their anonymity
and, often, in their de facto immunity.
Anonymity and immunity are indeed some of the advantages in forming an
organization. As Liaszos puts it: "Everyone has somebody over him, so there
is no one at the top. "' Criminal law does not cope well with organizational
crime, in part because criminal law doctrines remain oriented toward an intense
nineteenth-century individualism.2 It is thought that an organization cannot be
imprisoned, although an organizational death penalty (dissolution), or the
divestiture that is analogous to cutting off the thief's hand, is sometimes
available. The more organized the offender, the more immunity is enjoyed;
prosecution or conviction is less likely, and the offense is less serious and tends
to fall under the jurisdiction of a more lenient administrative agency.'
Bureaucracy may well be a more important discovery than the wheel for a
complex society with an extensive division of labor.' As a scholar remarked
to China's first Han emperor: "You conquered this country in a chariot - can
you rule it from a chariot?"' Law seeks to augment and maximize the value
of bureaucratic capacity (e.g., Ford's, the Environmental Protection Agency's)
by treating the organization as a "person," as the equal of a biological person,
despite the bureaucracy's demonstrably superior power and access to such
resources as information. (In international law, on the other hand, the "person"
is the nation-state; the PLO, et al. thus obtain a less than full recognition and
bureaucratic capacity.) Black's second dictum is thus that law varies directly
with organization.' Organizations are more litigious than individuals.
Organizations demand, produce, and distribute more law and other resources,
and powerful organizations are able to "penetrate" more deeply into society to
make their desires felt.
19. W. CHAMBuSS & R. SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 354-55.
20. Liaszos, supra note 1, at 345.
21. See Thompson, Criminal Responsibility in Government, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE 202, 210 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1985).
22. D. BLACK, supra note 12, at 93-95.
23. W. CHAMBUSS & R. SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 357.
24. J. ROBINSON, FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 52 (1970).
25. D. BLACK, supra note 12, at 86, 96.
350
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Urbanization made organizational innovation more or less inevitable, given
the increased capacity and need for collective action.' Unger sees a kind of
countervailing power at work: "As the state reaches into society, society itself
generates institutions that rival the State in their power and take on many
attributes (and problems) formerly associated with public bodies. "27
Governments are special kinds of organizations, since they and their agents
claim various formal (sovereign) immunities from law. Government agents
manage the means of criminal punishment, and it is unlikely that they will use
these means effectively against their own kind. The capacity, but not always the
reality, of using a legitimate violence is another defining characteristic of the
state.' Yet the image of this Leviathan does not answer the questions: What
is it? or Who controls it? Hobbes himself called corporations "lesser
Commonwealths," distinguished from Leviathan by their less absolute dominion.
Economics can be made to prove out the notion that bureaucracy is
bureaucracy, that private and public bureaucratic capacities are similarly mixed
blessings. The Reagan Administration may have obscured these similarities by
attempting to legitimate corporate bureaucrats and to delegitimate civil servants.
Both groups economize on some transaction costs, taking advantage of
specialization and a division of labor by the giving of orders within the
organization. But there is no free lunch, and an enhanced organizational power
and discretion must be paid for somehow. Individual (employee, consumer,
citizen) rights may be eroded and, what largely amounts to the same thing in
economics, the costs of monitoring the relevant organization may increase.
Economists assume that bureaucratized employees will shirk and otherwise
substitute their own goals for organizational goals unless costly systems for
monitoring, and for monitoring the monitors, are used effectively.' It is costly
26. B. BARNES, supra note 2, at 149.
27. R. UNGER, supra note 2, at 201.
28. See McCoy, The Cop World: Modem Policing and the Difficulty of Legitimating the Use
of Force, 8 HUM. RTs. Q. 270, 271-72 (1986); Thompson, supra note 21, at 214.
29. See Brietzke, supra note 3, at 69, 72. Private and public bureaucrats alike bid for similar
resources (e.g., colleagues), often in the same markets. Both seek power, wealth, and a security
of tenure, with a minimum of effort and visibility, through organizational growth and by pleasing
similar superiors in similar ways. Both kinds of bureaucracy tend to prefer precision, stability, the
coercion of would-be "free riders", and a formal equality, rather than an individualized justice,
competition, and opportunities for individual expression.
Rosenblum finds that the "chief business" of government "is negotiating and bargaining,
informing and inducing, planning and promising." Rosenblum, Studying Authority: Keeping
Pluralism in Mind, in AUTHORITY REvISITED 102, 103 (J. Pennock& J. Chapmaneds. 1987). True
enough, but these functions are also essential to production and distribution by most other
organizations. Government and many other organizations establish "transaction structures": the
terms of particular exchanges under different circumstances, terms which structure outcomes by
displacing markets. See Klevorick, supra note 3, at 301. Thus, E. Adamson Hobel's definition of
law as "the legitimate use of physical coercion by a socially organized agent" errs by selecting out
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for us to hold accountable a Congress that is in turn seeking to hold a Watergate
President accountable, costly for a shareholder to hold a Ford executive to
account, and costly for the executive to make the lowliest employee do his job.
Perhaps the most interesting facet of organizations is that their production
and distribution functions, and thus their growth and development, respond to
perceptions of an almost continuous crisis. Jurgen Habermas introduced this
insight when he generalized four interrelated crises:
The economic system does not produce [and distribute] the requisite
quantity of consumable values, or; the administrative system
[bureaucratic capacity] does not produce the requisite quantity of
rational decisions, or; the legitimation system does not provide the
requisite quantity of generalized motivation, or; the socio-cultural
system [or ideology] does not generate the requisite quantity of action-
motivating meaning.
30
While Habermas uses these crises to analyze adroitly the problems of
"advanced capitalist countries," the crises also precisely describe constraints and
failures in communist party-states and in the Third World. Indeed, most
organizations everywhere (Ford and the PLO, for example) are constantly
reacting to such perceived crises. Large American corporations and
administrative agencies see the emergence of new crises every few years. For
"business" to go on as usual, new theoretical explanations, ideological
justifications, and legal and other cures must be produced. 3' In Poland, for
example, a "regulation through crisis" fell apart under the pressures that led to
the declaration of martial law.32 As Black's third dictum33 has it, law varies
directly with crisis.
So much for organizational means, but what of organizational ends?
Economics helps us to generalize these as well, as the acquisition of a "market
power," even a monopoly, over the key resources an organization needs for
production and distribution. Power is a tricky thing to measure, for real power
consists in not having to use it in public and in making your definition of the
coercion from among many resource-combinationswith law. W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, supra
note 1, at 6. In so doing, Hobel implies that the state has a monopoly over lawmaking, an
implication refuted by an extensive private lawmaking in the areas of property, contract,
corporations, etc. Legal theory tends to treat private lawmaking as delegations of an indivisible
sovereignty, but it is more like a shared sovereignty in the real world.
30. J. HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 49.
31. J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATION PROCESS AND AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 7-9 (1978).
32. See Staniskis, supra note 5.
33. D. BLACK, supra note 12, at 87.
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problem "stick." We admire the power to do things while frowning upon a
closely-related power over others. United States Steel dominated its industry,
early in the twentieth century and with disastrous long-term consequences, less
through efficiency than by controlling 90% of iron ore, of coking coal, and of
the relevant rail transport.' So, too, do governments often succeed in
monopolizing a legitimate violence and other key resources. Such market power
is also a means to the twin and sometimes contradictory goals of an
organizational stability (usually the security of tenure and orderly succession of
leaders) and its strength.
III. GOVERNMENT AND STATE AS ORGANIZATIONS
Attempts to increase the stability of governments and the strength of states
play out in interesting ways. Government and state are not mystical entities,
"but an enormous, sprawling bureaucratic structure" encompassing many
different kinds of norms and people. A monopoly over violence "is supposed
to be wielded for [public]... goals rather than the private goals of the individuals
who occupy positions within its structure, or even the organizational goals of the
subsystems within it."" But such goal-substitution is a regular feature of
politics. The Chicago School of law and economics goes further to argue that
implementation of the goals of organized special interest groups, rather than
some "public interest," is an almost invariable feature of politics. The
distinction between private and public organizational activity, a distinction vital
to much of legal, other social science, and philosophical analysis, is usually
blurred beyond all recognition.
Many resources are dissipated through inconclusive competitions for power,
between pro-choice versus right to life groups or the PLO versus Israel. Indeed,
such dissipations are frequently the main assurance the powerless have of
retaining a measure of autonomy. Competitions are usually fierce; there is
always too little wealth and power to satisfy what all elite groups regard as their
minimum demands. Under conditions of an acute resource scarcity, as when
stockpiles of legitimacy and coercion run low in a Third World country,
production and distribution (or the politics of underdevelopment) tend to a
paternalistic despotism, frequently petty and sometimes benevolent. The Zambia
of President Kaunda is a good illustration of rather benevolent responses to
continuous crises.' Laws and organizations do not merely act in loco parentis;
34. D. Parsons & E. Ray, The United States Steel Consolidation: The Creation of Market
Control, 18 J. L. & ECON. 181 (1975).
35. W. CHAMBuss & R. SE1DMAN, supra note 1, at 271.
36. An old newspaper article introduces the topic:
In his somber "We are at war" speech... President [Kaunda] was responding to no
single overriding threat to his personal position. As he pointed out, Zambia has been
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they are direct manifestations of the parent's will. The "children," the relatively
poor and powerless "masses," consumers, or "silent majority," are regarded as
objects of exploitation for benevolent or other purposes. The reactions of the
poor and powerless range from bemused apathy to open rebellion. Such
reactions are displayed by peasants around the world during attempts to produce
from meager resources such outcomes as the "right" to be let alone.37
The paternal despot is a monarch, however called (e.g., the Chairman of
the ... Council), who presides over a regime too unstable to become a dynasty.
She (but for assassinations, Indira Gandhi may have founded a dynasty) would
like to be a modem-day Machiavellian Prince, directing a complex organization
to respond quickly and forcefully to perceived crises. But she also realizes that
monarchy is an anachronism in most countries, given the twentieth-century
collapse of the traditional sources of legitimacy that supported kingship. (Why
can we not apply the lessons of Iran and Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia, Morocco,
and Zaire; when the end comes, it comes quickly and usually while America's
pants are down.)
The most important political stability tradeoff a leader faces is between
survival in office (and often physical survival as well) in the short run and in the
long run. This is a tradeoff between quickly placating or eliminating enemies
by fair means or foul, and painstakingly creating new power bases to counter
insurgents, winning general support for good government, and ultimately
winning a place in history. (Too many of our "staunchest allies" are
incompetent at executing this tradeoff; their excessive emphasis on short-term
outcomes may be the reason why they are our allies in the first place.) In the
short run, competition for wealth and power seems to be a zero-sum game;
winners are seen to profit only at the expense of losers. But as resources are
produced and redeployed in new production and distribution functions, a far
from zero-sum game ensues. Those who are able to use resources can, ceteris
in a technical state of emergency since Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in 1965. But a combination of economic and diplomatic difficulties
aggravated by the Angolan civil war has left... Kaunda feeling angry, beleaguered and
certain that this is the time to turn and fight what he sees as the enemies of his country.
MacManus, Zambia's Peace Plan, Guardian (London), Jan. 30, 1976, at 13.
Since Macmanus' article appeared, Rhodesia became Zimbabwe but matters have otherwise
gone from bad to worse; the Angolan civil war has been joined by one in Mozambique and by
troubles with South Africa over Zambia's sheltering of ANC officials. World copper (Zambia's
main resource) prices have tumbled, agricultural production has stagnated, and foreign debt has
mounted. Bureaucrats have grown more venal, arrogant, and inactive. Alcoholism, robbery, and
burglary have become serious national problems. Several "constitutional" crises and serious local
rebellions have nearly toppled Kaunda. Ask not, then, why he is so despotic; ask, rather, why he
remains so benevolent and why he was not worn out long ago.
37. See Brietzke, The Seamy Underside, supra note 8, at 27-28.
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paribus, expect to acquire new ones through a process of political development.
But a rapid growth in resources usually means more controllers, and the relative
positions of the wealthy and powerful are eroded. If elites are satisfied with
their positions, they may use their resources to staunch the growth of others'
resources. A nascent push towards equality is then stifled, as happened during
America's Populist and Progressive eras.'
With meager stockpiles of resources, a leader has relatively little long-term
bargaining power to bring to any social contract. Kenneth Boulding39 argues
that the "individual gives up a good deal in terms of being taxed, conscripted,
killed or injured in wars, and burdened with the guilt of murder and
conscription; in return the state seems to give him little, except perhaps a bit of
security and a larger identity." The range of services demanded by increasingly
urbanized and sophisticated publics is greater than most regimes can manage
under crisis conditions. The remedy, usually credited to the French and the
Prussians, is that political leaders become more remote coordinators of
increasingly autonomous military/bureaucratic structures called "the state."
Such structures gradually augment their bureaucratic capacities by responding
to crises more or less effectively, by distributing privileges (rather than rights)
to individuals and organizations. This is how the New Deal produced our
longest-running political stability out of a manifest instability. The danger is one
of sliding into a public sector "imperialism," which some see in the Great
Society that eventually succeeded the New Deal. In the Third World, many
bureaucracies become parasitic, they consume (in the form of idleness,
corruption, etc.) more than they produce, and bureaucratic capacities never get
a chance to grow.
The emergence of a state (bureaucratic capacity) which is somewhat
independent of the life and power of political leaders sets up another interesting
tradeoff between the stability of the government and the strength of the state.
For lawyers, this tradeoff gets reflected in the constitutional and administrative
law analogues of property laws (who controls which resources), contracts law
(bargaining for access to resources), and corporations law (how resources are
aggregated, combined into production and distribution functions, and then used
to control others). Stability can be measured by the permanence and
effectiveness of constitutional rules about succession to high office, and strength
can be measured by the extent to which bureaucratic capacities are exercised
free of legal, politicians' and citizens', controls.
Historically, this tradeoff was first resolved in favor of the state and in the
38. Id. at 22-24.
39. A. BRETON, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 54 (1974)
(quoting Boulding).
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form of authoritarianism, which was a Machiavellism partly misunderstood.
State strength was purchased at the expense of an acute instability, of constant
shifts among increasingly powerful military, bureaucratic, and political factions
kept under control only by the patronage or the crude terror wielded by a
charismatic or otherwise unusual leader. We hope that Hitler's Germany and
Stalin's Soviet Union are the high-water marks of authoritarianism. The
egotistical paternalism of such leaders cannot find satisfaction in a regime
coextensive with their heartbeats and attention spans. But this seems to be a
lesson lost on some Third World leaders.'
Liberalism was the next tradeoff attempted, to curb the vices of
authoritarianism by entrenching the authority to challenge authority. Tolerance
of divergences in elite demands caused elites to fragment into smaller interest
groups ("incumbents") able to compete with each other without destroying
overall political arrangements. 4 ' Under the "rules of the game," such as
English "gentlemen" learn at public (private) schools and in their clubs, leaders
and parties relinquish office because they know their opponents will do the same
when another turn of the wheel ousts them from power.
In the United States, stability was deemed so essential yet so difficult to
achieve at the founding of the Republic that it was purchased at the price of an
extremely weak federal state. This amounted to a storing up of trouble for the
future. A weak state made judicial review both possible and essential for
resolving disputes, so long as the Supreme Court stayed well away from a
40. Brietzke, The Seamy Underside, supra note 8, at 22, 42. Three imperatives, the strong
state, militarization, and industrialization, are all deeply interrelated rationalizations of production
and distribution processes. But each imperative impinges on the other during fierce competitions
for scarce resources, competitions which promote instability. Hettne, supra note 2, at 457-59.
Authoritarianism's tendency to self-destruction, neglected by Plato, has been recognized since at least
Shakespeare's time:
[Elvery thing includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite;
And appetite, an universal wolf,
(So doubly seconded with will and power,)
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And last eat up himself.
Troilus and Cressida, I: iii, 119-24 (Ulysses speaking).
In a similar vein, Rousseau, usually depicted as a fellow-traveler of authoritarianism, wrote:
[Ilf force creates right, the effect changes with the cause. Every force that is greater
than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity,
disobedience is legitimate; and the strongest being always in the right, the only thing
that matters is to act so as to become most strong... . The strongest is never strong
enough unless he succeeds in turning might into right and obedience into duty.
S. FINER, THE MAN ON HORSEBACK 29, 31 (1975) (quoting Rousseau).
41. See THE FEDERAuSTNO. 51 (J. Madison); Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE
OF PURE TOLERANCE (R. Wolff ed. 1969).
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politically-bargained stability (a single departure, Dred Scott, proved to be a
disaster), and so long as there was no entrenched bureaucracy to challenge
judicial power. Until the 1937 "switch in time" enabled the judiciary to give
limited support to "welfare state" programs, the Court acted as the need arose
to keep the state underdeveloped and to allow special interests to repress the
pushes toward equality that led to the evolution of social democracy, under a
stronger state, in other countries. Since 1937, Americans have seen a limited
judicial power-sharing with public bureaucracies and a tortuous but necessary
reinterpretation of our eighteenth-century constitutionalism.42
Why characterize one of the strongest of military powers as a weak state?
The point is that almost all of the crises to which the American bureaucracy
responded have been military or related to the Cold War. These outcomes have
resulted in a massive but very narrow strengthening of the state. Policymaking
and implementation have thus been skewed in particular directions by the
exercise of narrowly-focused, unchecked state power. Yet many Americans
continue to believe in a comforting ideology about their life in a liberal
democracy.
In other Western countries, it became apparent by the end of World War
II that liberal democracy had reached a dead end from the standpoint of political
and constitutional development. The "working class" in these countries found
little comfort in the formalism and proceduralism of constitutions creating a
negative (or nightwatchman) state. Administrative functions had to be mass-
produced from scratch and immunized from judicial negation. The Rechtsstaat
becomes the Sozialrechtsstaat when the bureaucracy barters welfare programs
for public loyalty, to the state if not to the government of the day. Modern-day
variants of the Prussian Polezeistaat seek to fill legitimacy deficits up with
bureaucratic capacities, eroding the privatism of a liberal individualism while
implementing more communitarian ideals. Legally and as in contemporary
Britain, this process represents a rough mid-point between a liberal
separation/limitation of powers and their authoritarian concentration or fusion.4 3
At length, Robert Heilbroner makes a point" made more briefly by
42. Brietzke, The Seamy Underside, supra note 8, at 42-44.
43. Id. at 45-47.
44. As Robert Heilbroner points out:
[Piroblems are at least as much rooted in the nature of industrial society as they are
rooted in capitalism proper. For it is not only capitalist societies but socialist ones that
must cope with the problem of marshalling a labor force under conditions of growing
affluence (including in that term, let us emphasize, the assured provision of basic
needs). It is certainly not capitalism alone that will be marked by the growth of
bureaucracies organized to oversee the steady flow of production. Scientific and
technical elites have already appeared in the power structures of socialism as they have
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Dahrendorf: a worldwide search continues for an interchangeable law-and-
order socialism and a conservatism with a human face. Authoritarian regimes
are busy trading some state strength to gain a measure of political stability,
while liberal democratic regimes trade some political stability for a measure of
state strength. Each regime is becoming less like itself, in ways that overlap (as
social democracy/welfare statism) but do not converge. There is no need for
Third World regimes facing a "double" underdevelopment (political instability
in a weak state) to replicate wasteful lurches towards liberal democracy or
authoritarianism, ' despite the advice given by an American or Soviet ally. But
the constraints on further development are enormous, in the Soviet Union and
the United States no less than in Europe and the Third World.
IV. COPING WITH AND THROUGH LAW, LEGITIMACY, AND COERCION
A delicate balance among resources is obviously required for successful
tradeoffs between organizational stability and strength. There must be enough
legitimacy, not too much coercion, and enough but not too much ideology,
bureaucratic capacity, law, etc. In the 1970s and perhaps as fallout from the
Great Society, American confidence began to wane in the efficacy of throwing
in those of capitalism.
This is not to say that capitalist and socialist nations will not have their general
differences in coping with common problems. The capitalist group brings with it the
obsolete privileges of inherited wealth, of acquisitiveness as a dubious source of social
morale, of the clash between a "business" outlook of decreasing relevance and a
technical-planning outlook of uncertain strength. On the other hand, these nations
generally enjoy parliamentary forms of government that, if they withstand the transition
through planning, may provide useful channels for social adaptation.
On the socialist side we find the advantage of economic systems stripped of the mystique
of "private ownership" and the presumed legitimacy and superiority of the workings of
the market which is staging a comeback. On the negative side is the cumbersomeness
of their present planning machinery, their failure to develop incentives superior to
capitalism, and above all, their still restrictive political attitudes.
The hope, of course, is that we can combine the two - welding the best of socialist
economic practice with the best of liberal capitalist political practice. I have no
hesitation in setting such a goal as that for which we should strive in the coming middle
period. Whether it will be attainable cannot be predicted.
R. HEILBRONER, BUSINESS CIVILIZATION IN DECLINE 58-59 (1976).
45. R. DAHRENDORF, THE NEw LIBERTY 26-27 (1975).
46. As one commentator pointed out:
The drift toward a one-party state has less to do with Marxism than with Africanization.
The pattern can be seen in African states of varying ideological persuasions. A sort of
African hybrid of social democracy is taking shape that may not square with European
models, but it is more apt to resemble social and political structures in Sweden (perhaps
with a touch of Yugoslavia thrown in) than in the Soviet Union or China.
Manning, So Far, So Fair in Zimbabwe, NEw REPUBLIC, April 4, 1981, at 20.
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law, money, and/or a bureaucracy at a problem.47 In communist party-states,
it is similarly becoming apparent that throwing ideology, bureaucracy, or
coercion at a problem does not work either.
Much more research is needed, but it seems that Habermas and others are
right: legitimacy is the scarcest resource and is often the bottleneck to
assembling effective production and distribution functions. ' The organization
proposes, but some wider group ultimately disposes, such as employees,
consumers, citizens, and the international community. Just as Soviets greet
glasnost with a cautious warmth, so too have Americans persisted in denying the
ultimate accolade of legitimacy to large corporations or to administrative
agencies.49 Some outcomes these organizations produce and distribute are
greeted warmly -- but not pollution or incompetent attempts to regulate its
reduction -- while a distrust of their (market) power remains. Government, the
state, and their paucity of resources relative to needs spawned by perceived
crises, are properly seen as part of the problem as well as part of the solution.
To produce Roe v. Wade or a school prayer decision successfully, the
Supreme Court must produce many other decisions that serve to rebuild
47. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, supra note 1, at 4.
48. See M. FREEMAN, THE LEGAL STRUCTURE 54 (1974); Friedman, Law, Order and History,
16 S.D.L. REv. 242 (1971); HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 98; J. KAUTSKY, COMMUNISM AND THE
POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT 181-82 (1968); G. KENNEDY, THE MILITARY IN THE THIRD WORLD
6, 19-22 (1974); MCCARTHY, INTRODUCTION TO HABERMAS, supra note 2, at xiv-xvi; B. MOORE,
supra note 1, at 52-53; B. NWABUEZE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EMERGENT STATES 25 (1973); See
generally, sources cited supra note 2; See supra note 32 and accompanyingtext. Kennedy adds that:
The legitimacy crisis in the developing world rests on the inability of any of the
competing elites to sustain a political leadership for a long enough time for its concepts
of public good to be supported by other elites and by the masses. The conflict situation
is a permanent feature of the political system; it is pluralistic, involving conflicts within
the governing elite . . . and between the traditional and modernizing, between village
and city, peasant and worker, landlords and tenants, collective and individual,
Europeans and nationals, administrators and subjects, and the rising and falling groups.
G. KENNEDY, supra, at 55.
49. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1780-1970 (1970); J. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 49-273
(1977). See supra note 2 and infra note 32 and accompanying text. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 31,
at 262, places these attitudes within a larger loss of faith in traditional sources of American public
and social authority. The argument assumes (without proof) that these sources existed at some time
in the past. Conniff, Any Business that Has to Do with Food, You Got to Keep Rolling,
SMITHSONIAN, Nov. 1988, at 47, offers an instructive contemporary illustration: half of the
employees on duty at a Giant food store are being treated to soda, donuts, and "a pep talk about the
Giant way of life, 'People Who Care'." With a flip chart, the "motivator" is encouraging each
employee to treat customers as "company" in my "clean, organized, living room" of a supermarket.
But some employees doze, and one "works on a hangnail with the razor tip of her case-cutting
knife." The rest of Conniff's article shows that Giant cares greatly about profits and very little
about customers or employees as people.
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stockpiles of legitimacy. America's police have never legitimated their use of
violence, which is probably a good thing. Particular police officers supposedly
use violence under license from the government, but the scope of this license
(the major premise) is under more or less constant renegotiation. Factual
inferences (minor premises) are also constantly being drawn in cases involving
the police, leading to the conclusion that particular uses of force are legitimate
or illegitimate. Such conclusions build up or draw down legitimacy stockpiles,
indirectly affect such other resources as the size of the police budget voted by
a city council, and thus keep the police playing the game more or less by the
rules.
The ways in which insurgent and incumbent organizations deal with law,
legitimacy, and coercion are fascinating in their variety and complexity.
Without pretending to exhaust the subject, I will discuss three progressively
higher levels of sophistication in such dealings: the labeling of "deviants," the
.processing" of disputes, and the search for effective substantive constraints on
undesirable outcomes.
V. LABELING THE DEVIANTS
As Sir John Harington noted: "Treason doth never prosper. What's the
reason? For if it prosper, none dare call it treason. "S "Treason" is a label
affixed to insurgents by incumbents, provided the incumbents can make it stick
and retain their incumbent status. In Lebanon, no label sticks for long because
no group is a plausible incumbent. A mere label can have enormous
consequences, in calling down state-sanctioned (or incumbents') violence and
many other resources. If the Contras can plausibly be made into "freedom
fighters" rather than "terrorists," or a "Strategic Defense Initiative" can become
"Star Wars," the flow of resources and thus of outcomes is affected
significantly. But no matter how effective it is, and even if it is embodied in a
hundred-page statute, labeling is still vulnerable to attack as an unsophisticated
form of name-calling.
The conceptual framework for labeling is said to be a sociology of
deviance, where "deviant" is sometimes little more than a basis for dismissing
behavior we do not like or understand. This framework is presumably no worse
or better than an economics perspective. Economists might find that some
sociologists overstate the power of an abstractly-defined "society" and understate
the rationality and the success with which insurgent and even incumbent
50. HARINGTON, OXFORD BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 53 (3d ed. 1979).
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organizations pursue unofficial goals." Such goals are as good as any others
in economics, since preferences are assumed to be subjective and "interpersonal
comparisons of utility" are prohibited. In any event, there is no guarantee that
enhancing the stability and strength of a particular government and state will also
be the goals of a "society" composed of many types of people and organizations.
This is not the place to rehearse fully the perennial sociologists' dichotomy
between conflict and consensus. Suffice it to say that the consensus model
developed by Talcott Parsons 2 and others has so captured the imagination of
American social scientists that most lawyers, economists, etc. adopt it in a more
or less unthinking way. Their assumption is that law, legitimacy, and coercion
produce an equilibrium in fairly automatic ways. Deviance becomes a relatively
rare and isolated phenomenon (e.g., motorcycle gangs), which shows the need
for a bit of "social engineering" here and there: "treatment" or
"rehabilitation," for example. This positivist view is rather static; as in the old
Charles Atlas ads, "before" and "after" pictures do not account for the
sometimes-painful changes in between. But where more than a few insurgent
organizations demonstrate the will and the resources to produce and distribute
significant outcomes (those disturbing to incumbents), the conflict model begins
51. A. Liaszos, supra note 1, at 346-48. Liaszos finds a great deal of "schlock sociology"
associated with deviance theory. I do not wish to add to schlock economics - of which there is
plenty already - but a brief critique of deviance theory from what can be loosely termed an
economics perspective seems in order. The most striking thing is that deviance theory tends to deal
with "nuts, sluts, and 'preverts'", rather than with Nobel laureates or sophisticated organizations.
Id. at 330. When organizations are treated, lower-level functionaries - beat cops, mental hospital
nurses - are usually the focus of study. Presumably this is because, like psychiatrists, some
sociologists have a particular definition of "normality" in mind, a definition which justifies a
particular "treatment." Nobel laureates or a corporation whose top executives know their products
kill consumers are manifestly abnormal, but they either do not need treatment or cannot be made
to submit to it. Id. at 336, 345.
To an economist, a "deviant" sounds suspiciously like an "irrational" person. The economist
begins with the assumption of rationality (which also has its flaws) instead, and then counts the
outcomes. "Inadequate socialization" or behavior under the "strain of disorganization from rapid
social change" becomes less a deviance than a rational attempt to adapt as well as one can - with
limited resources for doing so. "Alienation" and "anomie" get produced and distributed as
outcomes because they are desirable to someone - if only to the sociologist-observer. A "deviant
subculture" becomes a source of resources for producing rival outcomes. The common sociologists'
observation that labeling often evokes the very outcomes complained of suggests that the label has
been incorporated into the deviant's production function; greater efficiency rather than shame or
the "looking-glass self" may be the result. Whether these outcomes are "good" or "bad" depends
on which criteria of evaluation are chosen - on what the chooser is trying to produce and distribute
by way of ideology. But see A. COHEN, DEVIANCE AND CONTROL 112 (1966); A. LisKA,
PERSPECrIVES ON DEVIANCE 30-33 (1987); S. TRAUB & C. LIrLE, THEORIES OF DEVIANCE iv,
2, 94, 241-42 (1980).
52. T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1970).
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to offer more realistic descriptions and prescriptions in some areas.53
"Homosexuals" may be deviants-by-definition, but "gays" become dissidents
when they organize to produce rival outcomes.
Marketplace imagery is obviously congenial to theories of a consensus
equilibrium, but economics also yields images of society as a cynically-
negotiated compromise among antagonistic interests. This social contract is kept
only so long as, and as far as, the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. The
notion of "commonly accepted rules" against which a deviance is judged
dissolves around the edges, especially when rational insurgents feel free to adopt
the rules they like and reject the rest.' Both order and change become
problematic yet "normal" when crises are faced under conditions of uncertainty
and incompetence.
Economics focuses on outcomes and on the constraints on producing and
distributing them. The label of conformist or deviant can be only one of many
things entering into a cost-benefit analysis of outcomes. Unless the label serves
to grant or withhold a crucial resource, legitimacy perhaps, the effect of the
label is likely to be marginal. It may, indeed, cause the incumbents more harm
than good. Government's extravagant claims to authority over all aspects of life
-- education, childrearing, sex, etc. -- may increasingly be called into question
and then circumvented (produced around) by deviants active in a particular area.
Stigmatizing Solidarity or Right to Life helps to keep it busy exploiting each of
many vulnerabilities. Attitudes of "us" and "them" grow more rigid, and
questions about who gets to make and enforce law are thus more likely to be
reopened.
Insurgents may go further to attempt fundamental changes in the choices on
offer from incumbents, choices that a consensus and the labeling of deviants are
said to protect. If the "owners" persist in refusing to sell or give up something
vital on any terms -- homes for the homeless or a Palestinian homeland --
insurgents will seek to cure this "market failure" by changing the market's
"transaction structure" into something like an eminent domain. Some form of
alternative society may spring up as a potentially dangerous reproach to the
incumbent society: brief and superficial "communes" in the U.S. or, in Eritrea,
53. See W. CHAMBuSS & R. SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 117-18; A. LIsKA, supra note 51, at
175-78, 205; E. SCHtUR, supra note 1, at 85; R. UNGER, supra note 2, at 31-32; R. UNGER, THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 34 (1986). Hettne, supra note 2, at 455, adds that:
"Because of conflicts with other emerging states and internal unrest, the process of state formation
was often quite violent. People therefore learned to conceive of their 'own' state as a protector and
the rest of the world as 'anarchical' and a threat to their security." Perhaps these attitudes of "us"
and "them" are then generalized in experiences with other organizations.
54. S. TRAUB & C. LtITLE, supra note 51, at xi.
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a guerilla society that literally went underground to escape airstrikes.
In communist party-states, a "second legality" or "underground law" is
growing up with the "second economy," alongside the older socialist legality
and in reaction to the overregulation of economic and social life. This "second
legality" emphasizes concepts akin to due process, juristic precision, and (a
limited tolerance for) individual bargaining and autonomy.5 There is some
evidence that these underground legal concepts are beginning to affect socialist
legality itself. But if an integration does not occur soon, two parallel systems
of production and distribution will harden into the dissensus that a labeling of
deviants is supposed to prevent. In 1968, the Kerner Commission saw the
nation rapidly moving toward two separate Americas, yet little has been done
in the meantime.' The Commission's diagnosis may have been faulty, or
perhaps the "other" America has been repressed or manipulated into a quietude
because it lacked sufficient entrepreneurial and other resources to organize for
rival outcomes.
VI. PROCESSING "DIsPuTES"
Rioters and guerrillas can be dealt with by the military or the police, but
they cannot otherwise be regulated. Such coercive dealings are frequently
ineffective, always prodigal in the use of scarce resources, and usually blunt
instruments incapable of producing delicately-adjusted outcomes. Incumbents
may thus seek to co-opt insurgents instead. Insurgents will then be given just
enough of a stake in the "system" to keep them playing the legal process
"game," without much affecting overall outcomes, or so the incumbents hope.
Would-be rival outcomes get labeled as disputes or claims, and these are then
processed into forms more acceptable to incumbents. Abandoning this process,
through recourse to a violent opposition for example, will mean forfeiting gains
made through prior claim adjustments. Like the monetary economy, the legal
process frequently succeeds in turning divergent objectives into motivations for
routine, conforming behavior.5 7  This technique amounts to a more
sophisticated labeling theory in reverse: giving a dog a good rather than a bad
name in the hope that it will behave accordingly. Conflict should then decrease,
to the extent that differences between incumbent and insurgent outcomes are
reduced and insurgents' cost-benefit analyses are altered. But incumbents will
be reluctant to change much, and insurgents have gained at least a minimal
55. Markowits, Law or Order - Constitutonalism in Eastern Europe, 34 STAN. L. REV. 513,
606-07 (1982).
56. KERNER COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 401
(1968).
57. See B. BARNES, supra note 2, at 129.
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access to such resources as law-making and enforcement.'
The success of this technique depends on insurgents' belief in the existence
of a system yielding desired outcomes. The architects, perhaps the leading
ideologists, of the American Legal Process School confidently assert: "A legal
system is a system - a coordinated, functioning whole made up of a set of
interrelated, interacting parts." The goals of this system are "establishing,
maintaining and perfecting the conditions necessary for community life to
perform its role in the complete development of man."" Elaborate efforts are
made to convince insurgents that "community" and "complete development"
include insurgents, and what amounts to the same thing, efforts are made to
legitimate the legal system and thus its governmental sponsors.
Crude forms of this Legal Process justification can be found in the older
formalism and positivism of John Austin, Christopher C. Langdell, and
others.' But their justifications do not benefit incumbents much when
insurgents (Critical Legal Studies scholars, for example) inevitably begin to
probe the many weaknesses of incumbent processes. The Legal Realists thus
began the search for more sophisticated justifications that continues today.
Order and justice cannot depend solely on the legal community's professional
understandings, on what philosophers might term a conventionalism.6 But we
must also recognize that the consensus over ends like order and justice, and over
much else, is rather limited. Hart and Sacks thus postulate a general
understanding about the terms of cooperation; a continuous and inescapable
interdependence usually transcends differences, even while organizations seek
58. See A. LISKA, supra note 51, at 202.
59. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPL1CATION OF THE LAW iii, 110 (1958).
60. These crude justifications retain some hold on Western middle-class cultures through, for
example, high school and even college and law school teachings. As is always the case with Legal
Process theories, courts provide the model of claim adjustment. The truth almost always emerges
in the course of an adjustment, under rules requiring an objectivity in fact-finding. Such findings
yield patterns previously anticipated and accounted for; each fact pattern is pregnant with its own
right rule. This rule is clear, consistent with other rules, and not open to question in this dispute.
Applying this rule is so routine and predictable an activity that little discretion is required and only
the occasional "bad" decisionmaker will screw up. See Carlen, Control in a Magistrate's Court,
in LAW AND SOCIETY 211, 212 (C. Campbell & P. Wiles eds. 1979); W. CHAMBISS AND R.
SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 178, 220; Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 1-2 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 201. Insurgents or
deviants may lose the outcome, but the process itself will be satisfying enough to keep them coming
back for more. This is an attempt to palliate conflicts temporarily (the short-term perspective), an
often-transparent attempt to paper over a dissensus which can exacerbate crisis conditions.
61. S. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 166 (1985).
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to produce rival outcomes.
62
The legal process itself thus gets used in efforts to plug the gaps in
consensus. There is an insistence on a legal logic (justifications for outcomes)
tight enough to leave little room for an arbitrary power.' To tempt insurgents
to come in under the legal process umbrella, the "historic bargain" of liberal
democracy exchanges a limited autonomy of legal institutions for their reciprocal
legitimation of political activity.' Law is made more distinctive, so that it is
less likely to be confused with other, perhaps discredited, social controls wielded
by incumbents. Separated from and given a limited control over politics,
formally at least, law is then imbued with Weber's hyper-rational ideals. In
exchange, legal institutions promise to practice self-restraint, the "passive
virtues." This is a tradeoff in which legal institutions surrender much control
over the substance of policy to gain a procedural autonomy, an autonomy that
is used to help legitimate the politically-bargained substance.
American lawyers would see Justice Frankfurter's, and thus Hart and
Sacks', procedural due process at work. This powerful resource for legitimation
held sway from the Court's 1937 "switch in time" and until legitimacy was
dissipated by the Burger Court's dissensus and incompetence over concocting
justifications. Frankfurterian justice is regularity, a means of getting one's
"due" under established rules. These rules are deemed to secure a (procedural)
equality when they are applied evenhandedly. Compelling demands for a
substantive equality are thought to illustrate the dictum that hard cases (about
widows and orphans, for example) make bad law. The legal process ideal then
spreads beyond legal institutions; for example, the process values of an
impersonal fair-dealing get reflected in the ideology of a "corporate social
responsibility. "'
62. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 59, at 1-2, 124. Their consensus is narrower and more
limited than those typically postulated by sociologists of process or of a structural-functionalism.
See W. CHAMBUSS AND R. SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 18.
63. See S. BURTON, supra note 61, at 173.
64. See supra note 28.
65. See JONES, KERNOCHON & MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD 762, 766 (1980); P. NONET & P.
SELZNICK, supra note 1, at 58, 67, 69; E. SCHUR, supra note 1, at 108-09; Selznick, Legality, in
LAW AND SOCIETY 125, 136 (C. Campbell & P. Wiles eds. 1979). Hart and Sachs argue that an
institutionalizing of procedures for the settlement of "questions of group concern" is the "central
idea of law." See H. HART AND A. SACHS, supra note 59, at viii, 4. Domination is legitimate only
if it takes place in accordance with a legal order whose validity is presupposed by the acting
individuals. Id. This is rather too formalistic. According to Rosenblum, the systematic
philosopher's answer to - "Why should I obey authority?""- is: "Because that is what authority
means." Rosenblum, Studying Authority: Keeping Pluralism in Mind, in AUTHORITY REvISITED
102, 107 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1987). The Frankfurterian answer might be: "Because
authority is based on fair procedures which generate neutral outcomes."
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Many of the costs and benefits of attempting to deal with insurgents through
the legal process can be traced through three examples: American labor,
American farmers, and the German Green Party. Unions had been America's
longest-running insurgent organizations. Incumbents saw union officials as
European-style radicals who endangered a growing corporate (incumbent
bureaucratic) capacity to "discipline" resources for production and distribution.
Initially, then, unions were labelled as deviant and repressed. Leaders were
jailed for criminal conspiracy, and one after another of the outcomes produced
by unions were decreed illegitimate.M  With most legitimate avenues
foreclosed, union temptations to (respond to) violence were sometimes
overwhelming, especially in mining areas during the 1920s. But Roosevelt saw
unions as playing important roles in producing New Deal outcomes. He brought
them into legal processes through a tradeoff: a limited legitimation of union
quarrels over how employers cut up the economic pie was exchanged for
limiting the unions' political role to one of lining their members up to vote
Democratic.
Klare generalizes the subsequent outcomes into a liberal democratic
"ideology" of collective bargaining:
By emphasizing process at the expense of substance, indeed, by
fostering the belief that "justice" is conceivable without regard to
substance, collective bargaining law nurtures the idea that industrial
democracy resides in the bargaining process itself, even if the "core"
issues have been removed from the table before the bargaining gets
started. Conceiving justice in procedural terms diverts attention from
the top-heavy asymmetry of power .... 67
This process has been so successful from the incumbents' point of view that,
often as not, a now-bureaucratized union coercion gets directed against itself, in
a tendency to self-destruct under Hoffa, Jackie Presser, etc., rather than against
66. For example, employers began to use "yellow dog" contracts: employee promises not to
unionize as a condition of employment. Playing the process game, unions lobbied successfully in
Kansas to have such contracts declared illegal. But the U.S. Supreme Court held the Kansas statute
unconstitutional; it "naturally happens" that parties to a contract "are not equally unhampered by
circumstances." Coppage v. Kan., 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915). The employees' threat to strike ifa
closed shop (all employees must join the union) is not granted was declared illegal in Hitchman Coal
& Coke v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917). But the employer's threat to fire the employee if the
employee did not agree to a closed non-union shop remained legal. A state statute restricting the
use of injunctions during a labor dispute was declared unconstitutional in Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312 (1921). Employers could thus continue to misuse the Sherman Act of 1890 to obtain an
injunction against a strike, despite fairly clear language to the contrary in the Clayton Act of 1914.
67. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
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management. Pushes toward a social democracy/welfare statism' like those
sponsored by unions in other countries have been safely aborted. A brief
contrast with Poland under martial law is relegated to a footnote.6
The history of American farmers is perhaps the mirror image of labor's.
Farmers might have been the quintessential incumbents Jefferson hoped they
would become in an agrarian society, but it proved impossible for independent
and physically isolated farmers to augment their power by organizing effectively.
Corporations succeeded as organizations and passed farmers by; a late
nineteenth-century agrarian populism lost out to a corporate logic of economic
growth. Roosevelt tried the same tactics he used on labor, syndicalist tactics
Hitler and Mussolini were using for different purposes, but Roosevelt was
stymied when the Supreme Court held his Agricultural Adjustment
Administration unconstitutional.' Over time, farmers grew increasingly
marginal to coalitions of incumbents, although they are still lauded and
occasionally thrown a bone because their support is sometimes needed in the
Senate, in "Southern strategies," etc.
By the 1980s, farmers were playing the game just the way government
"experts" advised, going deeply into debt to produce more and more. But
family farmers lost, economically and then through legal processes. Ostensibly-
protective foreclosure procedures failed many of them and, this time, farmers
lacked the political power to obtain a Blaisdell solution7 from a legislature.
68. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
69. Staniskis comments that:
The creation of mediating structures [a role American unions cheerfully play] is
exceedingly difficult. Authorities seem to be afraid of genuine, lively union structures.
[Like Roosevelt, Polish authorities] might be willing to negotiate a formula for self-
limitation by Solidarity, but they can hardly afford it. [While other East European
rulers were working against such a formula, Polish] authorities know that the crisis is
deepening, and they need unions as a buffer. Chances to recreate corporative structures
are minimal.... Using the Church as a mediating structure is difficult because of the
apparatus' anti-clerical attitudes.
Staniskis, supra note 5, at 100.
At this level, the big difference between the U.S. and a Poland under martial law is that
American incumbents are well endowed with buffers and mediation structures. Indeed, liberal
democratic processes excel at producing such organizations. American labor needs the incumbents
more than vice versa.
70. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). This was a case of unfortunate timing for
farmers and for Roosevelt, coming just before the 1937 "switch in time." See, e.g., Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937): Ignoring Butler, congressional powers for dealing with old age
benefits are unlimited during an economic emergency. See also supra note 23.
71. In Home Bid. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), a Minnesota statutory
moratorium on foreclosure of mortgages, an apparent violation of the Contracts Clause, was upheld
as constitutional because of the economic emergency of the Depression. Note that this decision was
prior to both the 1937 "switch in time" and Butler.
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Some farmers are thus rapidly sliding into an insurgency, into joining the
Rainbow Coalition, a right-wing religious and/or anti-semitic group, etc. The
occasional murder of a rural banker or coerced boycott of a farm foreclosure
auction masks subtler but more significant changes. Small-town bankers and
agricultural extension agents, stereotypical incumbents who control the scarcest
resources for much of local production, have been pushed off their pedestals.
They can no longer organize rural life as effectively, and many complain that
"no one speaks to me at the Lion's Club or the bowling alley any more."'
Powerline, on the other hand, shows farmers "winning" one. A high-
voltage powerline running through rural Minnesota was to be sited under State
statutes and policies lauded for their emphasis on public participation. Farmers
played this process game (as Blacks, feminists, environmentalists, and other
moderate insurgents are encouraged to do), appeared at all the relevant hearings,
and lost. An experts' "avoidance rating" preferred State lands, forests, and
interstate highways over farm lands, so it was unlikely that the farmers ever
could have won by rerouting the powerline. After they lost in court, the
farmers took their harassment beyond the legal process. They blocked surveyors
with farm machinery and disrupted radio communications by running chain
saws. The largest mobilization of Minnesota state troopers in history proved
fruitless because an experienced antiwar activist was planning farmer activities.
As soon as electricity pylons were erected, "boll weevils" knocked some of
them down. Vital glass insulators became clandestine targets for farmer-
marksmen, and the power did not flow. Such "violence" is clearly not
illegitimate among local residents. The failure of legal processes to produce
desired outcomes made insurgents out of incumbents.
Like many other insurgents, some farmers and unemployed people have
concluded that their demands are not "disputes" that can be sensitively processed
under existing procedures. The Process model produces much wealth for the
lawyers who believe in it, but too little for farmers and wage earners. Their
claims are substantive: the "property" right to farm or to a job that would
enable their resource stockpiles to be replenished and that only a more activist
state can satisfy and finance. (The "right" to an abortion is hollow for a woman
unable to afford one.) A liberal democratic Process model's jealous scrutiny
(under a separation of powers) by legislature and court keeps the bureaucratic
capacity of something like a welfare state from evolving. "Due process" curbs
a bureaucratic discretion exerted for good as well as for evil purposes. Whether
72. Bennett, Farm Bankers Anguished by Fall from Pedestal, AMERICAN BANKER, Feb. 4,
1985, at 1; Malcolm, Murder of a Banker in Minnesota Spurs Manhunt for Failed Farmers, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1983, at § 1, p. 1.
73. B. CASPER & P. WELLSTONE, POWERLINE: THE FIRST BATTLE OF AMERICA'S ENERGY
WAR (1981).
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an eighteenth-century constitutionalism will continue to be successful in resisting
some demands for redistribution remains to be seen. (Some demands get
satisfied by, for example, Defense Department expenditures that are in part
corporate welfare programs.) Warren Court procedural reforms, which
multiplied opportunities for asserting claims, have been stretched to their limits
and are now shrinking on the rebound. Such reforms kept many civil
rights/civil liberties advocates playing the game as moderate insurgents, but
these stopgaps clearly cannot accommodate all who would use them."4
The Green Party is perhaps the most interesting and dangerous (for
incumbents) example. From the late 1960s on, German incumbents were
harried by many militant and sometimes violent insurgents. As groupings of
these radicals, the Greens were apparently brought into the legal processes to co-
opt insurgency; the West German Federal Constitutional Court certainly had and
has the power to choose to ban the Greens.75 Co-option seemed to work for
a time. After the 1983 elections, the three incumbent parties treated the Greens
as an anomaly and shut them out of sensitive posts and information. (The CIA
similarly uses alleged congressional committee leaks as ex post facto
justifications for failing to supply information to Congress.) But the Greens did
their homework well. They effectively challenged old-boy networks and habits,
and they put environmentalism and embarrassing clandestine activities on the
political agenda. 76
Chernobyl and industrial pollution of the Rhine operated to favor the
Greens, who increased their share of the vote from 5.6 % in 1983 to 8.3 % in the
1987 elections. Although they lost out in recent elections, the Greens are
significant insurgents with a very intellectual approach to politics. Their
conceptions of economic growth, international security, and the dangers posed
74. Buchanan, Political Equality and Private Property: The Distributional Paradox, in
MARKETS AND MORALS (G. Dworkin, G. Bermant & P. Brown eds. 1977); P. NONET & P.
SELZNICK, supra note 1, at 105-06; R. UNGER, supra note 2, at 180.
75. In the Communist Party Case, 5 B. Verf. GE 85 (1956), the German Court banned the
Party because of a "smear campaign", "statements" and "actions" that "fundamentally criticize...
the general political goal" of the German "free democratic order." This order "accepts as given the
existing political and social order," but the Party does not. In the Socialist Reich Party Case, 2 B.
Verf G GE 1 (1952), the Court found that, like the Nazis, the SRP rejects "human dignity, freedom
and equality" and "indulges in platitudes, lays down general demands that are the common property
of almost all parties... and makes vague and utopian promises that are hardly compatible with each
other." SRP "insults," etc. have nothing to do with free speech or "genuine political opposition."
Its "concept of Reich differs from the notion of Reich in the best German tradition." Under these
loose criteria, almost any week's-worth of statements by the Greens would entitle the Court to ban
the Party. Case translations quoted in W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, supra note 7, at 602-03, 625-
26.
76. Pond, Germany 's Greens Want Higher Profile in Government, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR,
Feb. 13, 1987, at 13.
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by the nation-state strike at the heart of incumbent outcomes." The Greens try
to be a broad party, encompassing both the Realo's impure influence within
legal processes and the Fundi's pure resistance: shutting nuclear plants down,
leaving NATO and the EEC, and destroying the state monopoly over violence
so that resistance groups can use it more effectively. There is a limited
collaboration between these factions, and Realos are reluctant to distance
themselves from what German criminal law now labels a "terrorist offense":
attacks on electricity pylons like those in Minnesota. But the Greens' breadth
did not serve to co-opt German contributions to a 1985 "Euroterrorist" wave or
1987 increases in violence as a form of youthful protest. Dany Cohn-Bendit,
now a Green but formerly a student activist in the Paris of 1968, terms these
Chaosen (chaos-minded) demonstrators "marginalized youth."'
Plus ca change ... (Cohn-Bendit was thought the chaos-minded youth of
1968), but German incumbents might be said to have lost their gamble. Green
cosmopolitanism has provoked reactions of a parochial, perhaps fascist,
chauvinism.' 9 There is some chance that the Greens will attain a genuine
incumbent power, which would presumably cause their movement to fragment.
An organization like the Greens lacks the hierarchical authority structure of, say,
a corporation, a structure that enables an organization to discipline its
"resources" for the consistent production of particular outcomes. The Fundis
could regularly (some would say more regularly) go violently underground,
leaving the Realos to play at incumbency -- just as the Political Wing of the IRA
is left with a seat in Parliament and many local government offices.
An adaptability of rational organizations maximizing perceived outcomes,
the above-ground plus the below-ground for example, can stymie even the
sophisticated legal processes of Germany and Britain. Insurgents can practice
expediency as well as or better than incumbents, who are tempted into cycles of
tolerance and repression that dissipate legitimacy and other crucial resources.
Insurgents do not necessarily subscribe to the lawyers' ideology of the legal
system as a system. A cost-benefit analysis may dictate accepting part of the
system for some purposes and rejecting the rest, especially the rest that serves
existing outcomes and distributions of power.' Preoccupied with outcomes of
77. Hettne, supra note 2, at 453.
78. Fisher, Young Make Violent Comment on Dull West German Politics, (London) FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 1987, at 3; Markham, Chernobyl and Dirty Rhine Helps the Greens Grow, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 1987, at 4.
79. Hettne, supra note 2, at 463.
80. Raz sees a "popular mistake", that autonomy and authority are reconciled through consent.
Government by Consent, supra note 2, at 83. Implicitly in Plato's Crito, the "Laws argue that if
the citizen accepts the terms of the contract when it suits him, he must also accept the obligations
of the contract when it goes against him." I. F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES 225 (1988). That
may be so in logic or ethics, but it is certainly not the case in politics.
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their own, organizations are not very interested in lawyers' procedural and
institutional outcomes. An organization may be unable to perceive the "public
interest" as clearly as some lawyer drafting administrative laws thinks (s)he can,
and the organization may in any event prefer its own special interests.
When we abandon Western Process models, results will of course be very
different. Presumably, no amount of co-opting by incumbents will reduce
violence in South Africa. There is no plausible legal process for insurgents to
regard as legitimate, and violence and the wealth produced by it seem to be the
only things incumbents understand. Yet process values have taken tenuous holds
recently in Argentina, Brazil, the Philippines, and a few other places in the
Third World, which seems all to the good.
VII. CONSTRAINTS, MORAL AND AMORAL
Bedau argues that theorists of revolution must "identify the paradigm
around which the anomie, injustice, and malfunction in our society can be
interpreted.... ""' I have tried to identify one, obviously incomplete, law and
economics paradigm. It locates the trouble in extant production and distribution
functions. The labeling of deviants and the proceduralism of a liberal
democratic (or negative) constitution have done much to shape these functions,
so little real change can be expected from within their status quo. Citing
Habermas, Rubin finds that nominally apolitical and coherent legal doctrines
serve to repress moral or enancipatory instincts, by means of a "technocratic
objectivism."' Revolution is one obvious solution, but many economists and
others would point out that rarely if ever do revolutionary outcomes satisfy the
bulk of insurgents; it is difficult to justify revolution in the hard light of a cost-
benefit analysis.'
Less extreme constraints on undesirable outcomes may produce less
theoretically satisfying but more practically useful results. For example,
General Motors might like to kill (bankrupt, take over) Ford (or Tucker), but
the law frequently keeps this from happening on the assumption that competition
among manufacturers benefits the public. Society necessarily rests on some
organizations and their outcomes constraining other organizations and outcomes.
The circumstances of a particular underdevelopment are created by outcomes
produced and distributed in the past. They also represent the current constraints
81. Bedau, Revolutionary Theory, Revolutionary Non-Violence and Revolutionary Rights, 5
PHIL. IN CoNTEXT 67, 76 (1976).
82. J. HABERMAS, supra note 2; Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86
MicH. L. REV. 1835, 1869, 1888 (1988).
83. Consider Ethiopia, for example. See P. BRIETzKE, LAW, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION (1982).
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on incumbents' choices for dealing with each other, with insurgents, and with
the poor and powerless. The patterns (the transaction structures or terms of
trade) formed by interdependent outcomes, constraints, and dealings can all be
changed fundamentally through the process of development. This is a relative
and multidimensional process; nation-building in the Third World is mirrored
by the many reconstructions of, for example, labor relations and farming"
needed in the First and Second Worlds."
Liberal practitioners of a constitutional theory have been searching for
constraints on undesirable outcomes. But their typical emphases on procedures
and on legitimating an unelected Supreme Court seem to have frustrated this
search. The quest for substantive constraints is as old as natural law and as new
as Dworkin's latest book. But having long had the field to itself, much of
current jurisprudence has become rather loose in argument, stale, and inward-
looking -- preoccupied with beloved finer points. Attacks by law and economics
and by Critical Legal Studies are forcing legal philosophers to look to their
laurels by coming up with more relevant and compelling analyses."
The economists' model of market behavior is diametrically opposed to
Western ethical traditions and their emphasis on altruism." The market suffers
from all of the defects of any ethnocentric social science metaphor, yet it has
been applied with some success to many non-market and even non-capitalist
situations. In the many areas where self-interest consistently rules, the profit
motive becomes a part of nature. Any jurisprudential attempt to define a public
interest above and apart from the sum of individuals' self-interest must therefore
be illegitimate. Legitimacy no longer comes from the higher reaches of a
philosophy or ideology but from below: the inherent justice of marketplace
exchanges.'s
Above all, economics attacks the jurisprudential assumption that rational
84. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
85. Brietzke, The Seamy Underside, supra note 8, at 13, 38. See also J. HABERMAS, supra
note 2, at 49. Almond and Powell have made an excellent start at identifying combinations of choice
and constraint in the Third World. They identify five "models", each of which arguably spawns
a distinctive type of constitution: 1) democratic-populist governments, such as Nkrumah's Ghana;
2) governments such as Brazil's and Indonesia's, where the middle class pushes for economic growth
while the cost to government of keeping order escalates wildly; 3) a more equitable "authoritarian-
technocratic-equalitarian" strategy pursued in, for example, Kenya and South Korea; 4) the
"authoritarian-technocratic-mobilizational" strategy used in Taiwan, Cuba, Mexico, and Tanzania;
and 5) such neo-traditional or "neo-patrimonial" states as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. G. ALMOND
& G. B. POWELL, COMPARATIVE POLITICS 204-07, 220, 231, 371-87, 420-21 (2d ed. 1978).
86. Brietzke, supra note 3, at 77.
87. Weisskopf, supra note 7, at 35, 37.
88. Brietzke, supra note 3, at 77.
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behavior can be effectively constrained by the appropriate general and uniform
rules. Some economists plausibly argue that American corporations and
administrative laws are all but useless as constraints on organizations. These
economists find that shareholders can rely instead on a greedy and grasping
management, which is constrained to keep profits and thus share prices high by
the no less greedy insurgents plotting a takeover of the corporation through
efficient capital markets. This constraint makes corporations efficient, but the
lack of an equivalent market constraint on administrative agencies permits their
inefficiency.' Analyses like these show law and economics to be self-
consciously and even self-confidently amoral. Legal constraints are only
marginal costs and benefits, which are needed only in the rare instances of
market failure and which are factored into rational analyses to the exclusion of
altruism (e.g., corporate managers or public bureaucrats serving public interests)
and other moral promptings.
As useful as some of its recommendations may be, law and economics is
an imperfect paradigm. Parsons' shows how a nineteenth century
economics/utilitarianism neglects the "social order"; cooperation based on
shared interests and a moral attachment to norms, among other things,
necessarily supplements fortuitous and unstable congruences of self-interest. Yet
many economists naively assume that a self-interested rationality operating
through markets will always or usually be an adequate constraint on undesirable
outcomes. Unfortunately, the relevant markets are often uncompetitive and they
frequently fail outright. Such occurrences permit the exercise of unconstrained
private power that, in turn, licenses public interventions. Such interventions are
frequently more extensive than the marginal adjustments to costs and benefits
recommended by economists. This is because government is much more than
an alternative supplier of consumer goods to households. Government engages
in activities ignored by many economists, perhaps because economists' rules do
not always govern these activities: nationbuilding or repair, the protection and
89. See Fishel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978); Hindley, Capitalism and the
Corporation, ECONOMICA, Nov. 1969, at 426; Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 617 (1975); R. UNGER, supra note 2, at 179; Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). But it can be convincingly
argued that administrative agencies face "takeovers" - through congressional appropriations, etc.,
and changes of the presidential guard - more frequently than do most large corporations. According
to Greer, private constraints on government include the need "to limit public-policy choices to those
that do not result in massive capital flight; governments must remain within the restraints imposed
by investor confidence; and the judiciary must tailor its holdings to the fundamental social limits
imposed by a capitalist order regardless of personal values." Greer, Antonio Gramsci and "Legal
Hegemony", in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 304, 306 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
90. T. PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION (1949); B. BARNES, supra note 2, at 22-
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violation of human rights, and deploying a wider variety of social controls than
can be produced by most private organizations. Canons of legitimacy enable
governments to pursue effectiveness (e.g., nuclear weapons programs designed
to make the rubble bounce several times) or income redistributions desirable to
some, rather than an economist's narrowly-conceived efficiency.
Inequalities persist and probably increase during an economist's pursuit of
efficiency (wealth maximization) under status quo ("given") distributions of
wealth and power. Law and economics thus operates systematically to favor
liberty values (liberal democratic freedoms from governmental intervention) over
equality values, while effective dealings among incumbents and with different
kinds of insurgents require some delicate balance among liberty and equality
values. For several reasons, then, law and economics lacks an adequate concept
of justice. America's legal process has rather efficiently implemented the
interests and the liberty values of middle- and upper-class businessmen,
professionals, and artisans. But the system produced a less than just share for
slaves, sharecroppers, native Americans, women, and other resource-poor
groups.9 Law and economics seems unable to tolerate changes in the system
that would produce the corrective justice such insurgents are beginning to
demand.
Dworkin and some other legal philosophers are struggling with some
success against the growing dominance of our legal culture by an economist's
taste-shaping. The most effective jurisprudential tactic seems to be the
elaboration of a substantive morality of justice, to counter an amoral
efficiency/wealth maximization.' Unfortunately, some philosophers have
difficulty applying moral constraints to organizations. Their worry is that
organizations lack minds and thus "the emotional capacity to be moved by
moral concerns".' This seems an unnecessary worry. Organizations clearly
have the will to produce unjust outcomes that individuals within these
organizations would be unable (for lack of resources) or afraid to produce by
91. Friedman, supra note 48, at 249-52.
92. One argument is that a procedural "morality of means" which consistently favors existing
patterns of power and privilege will, for some insurgents and legal philosophers at least, frustrate
the very expectations of fairness that the legal process is to designed to encourage. See P. NONET
& P. SELZNICK, supra note 1, at 67. Contrary to amoral theories of deviance or economic
rationality, insurgents are often moral "persons" marching to the beat of a different drummer:
Gandhi, Martin Luther King, etc. Occupying the high ground, these insurgents may put the moral
or ideological (as opposed to the legal) burden of proof on incumbents ("liberal" Afrikaners or
Israelis, for example) concerning their conformity with injustice. See A. LISKA, supra note 51, at
70.
93. Thompson, supra note 21, at 211.
94. Wolf, 7he Legal and Moral Responsibility of Organizations, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE 267, 279
(J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1985).
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themselves. The law can thus reason backwards from this will to attribute a
moral responsibility to the organization, in the same way the law attributes
"personhood" to it. A second legal fiction may, in other words, be required to
cure the defects and unfair advantages spawned by the first, organizational
personhood being too deeply embedded in our law and culture to be dislodged
at this stage. Permitting a powerful organizational "person" to engage in
immoral behavior is too great a risk for ajust society to run. Constrained to act
as if it were moral, an organization may over time develop the habit of
morality.9"
The most popular and enduring moral constraints are human rights, "sundry
claims to be, to have, to do, and to receive" " that provide "adequate
opportunities for hope, for fulfillment, and for equality of treatment."' Like
the utilitarianism on which it is based, law and economics can be at its least
attractive when dealing with rights. Rights become relative, subjective, and
produced and distributed in a "porkbarrel" fashion. Thus our first amendment,
which has inspired much legal theology, becomes special interest legislation for
the academics, newspaper owners, and clergy who exerted much influence over
adoption of the Constitution. No good reason can be found in Posner's
economics for prohibiting the voluntary contracts of self-enslavement that
maximize the wealth of slave and master alike.s
95. That is, law ways can indeed shape foiays. But see Wolf, supra note 94, at 279, 282:
Organizational "policies and actions merely seem to express values and goals, as a tree trunk or an
inkblot might seem to represent a human face." Perhaps, but if the "inkblot" produces moral or
immoral outcomes, why not reward or punish it accordingly? The failure to do so leaves the
organization with all of the benefits of personhood and fewer of the costs. Wolf does admit that
organizations have the capacity to be "guided" by moral goals. Id. How does this differ from the
application of a moral constraint? Part of thq problem may be a failure of imagination in designing
organizational rewards and punishments. Thompson notes that organizations cannot be imprisoned.
But their "personhood" can be suspended, by suspending their articles of association for a period,
or terminated entirely (dissolution) or in part (divestiture). Thompson, supra note 21, at 210. A
constitutional or philosophical right of association need not include the right to produce outcomes
prohibited to biological persons. The German Court may have gone too far in the regulatory
direction (see note 75, supra), but Wolf goes too far in the opposite direction: "When we blame
the Ku KJux Kan for its activities, we blame the members for choosing to perform them. When
we praise Amnesty International, we praise the founders, managers, and donors...." Wolf, supra
note 94, at 280. But "we" may be smarter than this; we may realize that Amnesty or the Klan can
produce moral or immoral outcomes far beyond the capacity of any or even all of their numbers
acting separately.
96. Claude, The Western Tradition of Human Rights in a Comparative Perspective, 5 COMP.
JURID. REv. 3, 9 (1977).
97. Goldstein, On the Function of Criminal Law in Riot Control, in CRIMINAL LAW AND
SOcIETY 343, 346 (A. & J. Goldstein eds. 1971).
98. In part this state of affairs reflects the reluctance of some economists to make judgments
about good and bad in society, judgments they fear would return economics to the inferior
(unscientific) status of a moral philosophy. Some economists thus allow the "value-neutral" (more
accurately amoral) criterion of efficiency/wealth maximization to trump and even define rights.
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In the end, the "utility-rights dilemma" turns out to be a false
dichotomy." At least one facet of the economics-based analyses described
earlier, the need for tradeoffs under conditions of scarcity, both adds to our
understanding of the amoral basis for rights and cuts through some of the
ideology of a self-satisfied sloganeering about rights. To generalize, individual
political rights (liberty values) arose in liberal democracies reacting against an
authoritarianism. Individual and a few group economic rights (equality values)
emerged later, in communist party-states reacting against both liberal democracy
and right-wing authoritarianism. But political stability within a strong state,
effective dealings among incumbents and with diverse insurgents and the poor
and powerless, seems to require a rough balance between liberty and equality.
Some liberal democracies, Britain more than the U.S., thus traded political
rights for economic rights, while some (former) communist-party states, Poland
more than the Soviet Union, are now trading economic rights for political
rights."'
The end-points of this process are presumably social democracies or welfare
states that remain quite distinct from each other. Such regimes, Sweden's, for
example, frequently attempt the best and sometimes achieve the worst tradeoffs
among political and economic rights. In the Third World, leaders often assert
the need to trade political rights for the economic development that then does not
materialize. This tradeoff may be incompetently executed or it may mask a
struggle for short-term survival in office.°"
Two problems can be identified, problems that hinder tradeoffs or any other
effective implementation of rights. The first concerns organizational rights and
the duties with which these correlate. As mentioned before, law is usually
unable to cope with organizations qua organizations and treats them as persons
instead. This treatment on balance confers more effective rights and fewer
Charles Fried therefore pleads that rules about bargaining not themselves be subject to the (Coase
Theorem) bargaining process. There must be a "realm of moral discourse and concern for rights
that stands outside the frictionless bargaining process." Fried, Difficulties in the Economic Analysis
of Rights, in MARKETS AND MORALS 12-13 (G. Dworkin, G. Bermant & P. Brown eds. 1977). A
self-respect based on minimal standards of physiological integrity is a moral precondition to
bargaining. Id. But as Bentham remarked, inalienable rights often get alienated somehow.
99. It need not be the case that the objects of rights either are or are not components of human
goods or welfare. A rights-based autonomy versus a goal-based well-being is largely another way
of making liberty and equality into mutually-exclusive absolutes. See also A. Gerwith, Can
Utilitarianism Justify Any Moral Rights, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 158, 159 (J. Pennock
& J. Chapman eds. 1982); Pennock & Chapman, Introduction, in id. at xvii. A rough balance
between these values is arguably essential to political stability in a strong state. To this end, rewards
and punishments can be designed so that utility is increased through respecting the rights of
autonomy - especially if the economic preconditions to autonomy are taken into account.
100. Brietzke, The Seamy Underside, supra note 8, at 58-60.
101. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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enforceable duties than are conferred on biological persons. Apart from the
legal fiction of the organization as a person, there is no reason to confer full
moral rights on an organization. For example, denying free speech to a
corporation does not operate to deny free speech to the humans associated with
it. No one is entitled to an effective free speech, to an organizationally-enhanced
power to have one's self-interested views adopted. Organizational rights and
duties could be assigned in an amoral, utilitarian fashion, subject to being
modified or overridden when they conflict with the interests and the (moral)
rights of a majority of biological persons." 2 We might then begin to devise
the principles and entitlements of "community" life, relatively free of
organizational interference. 3  Do we, for example, have the right and
perhaps the duty to protect human dignity in the South African part of an
international community?" 4 If we do, organizations with vested interests in
the South African status quo should not be allowed to interfere by interposing
their rights.
The second problem concerns the resources available to produce and
distribute rights. These are the very same resources (law, legitimacy, coercion,
ideology, bureaucratic capacities, etc.) that are already heavily implicated in
many outcomes that violate rights and rebuff insurgents. The resources may
thus be discredited -- legitimacy and legitimation processes may be regarded as
illegitimate by some insurgents -- and this may serve to discredit good faith
attempts to use these resources to implement moral constraints. Harold Laski's
comments about law can be taken to refer to other resources as well:
Those who speak of restoring the rule of law forget that respect for
law is the condition of its restoration. And respect for law is at least
as much a function of what law does as of its formal source. Men
break the law not out of an anarchistic hatred ... , but because certain
ends they deem fundamental cannot be attained within the [existing]
framework.... To restore the rule of law means creating the
psychological conditions which make men yield allegiance to the
law. 105
Laski's "creating the psychological conditions" reflects an interdependence of
-102. Thompson, supra note 31, at 214.
103. R. UNGER, supra note 53, at 36.
104. Government by Consent, supra note 2, at 80.
105. See Goldstein, supra note 97, at 346 (quoting Laski's Reflections on the Revolution of Our
Time). See supra notes 2, 13-14 and accompanying text. P. NONEr & P. SE.ZNICK, supra note
1, at 5, add that: "The 'rule of law' in modern society is no less authoritarian than the rule of men
in pre-modern society; it enforces the maldistribution of wealth and power as of old, but it does this
in such complicated and indirect ways as to leave the observer bewildered." Id. The citizens' duty
to obey law has its correlative in a scrupulous official fidelity to law. Id. at 6.
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resources and a need to assemble them into legitimate "functions" before rights
can be produced and distributed effectively. Apparently we must first respect
our resources, constraining their use in unjust outcomes for example, before
their use to produce moral constraints will be respected in turn.
This sounds like a chicken-and-egg dilemma, and we seem to have reached
a dead end: an amoral law and economics is an imperfect paradigm, yet it
makes some or many telling points against a jurisprudential imposition of
substantive moral constraints. Perhaps jurisprudence and law and economics
could play to each other's strengths rather than weaknesses, in aid of rights
prescriptions both desirable and feasible. A more pragmatic morality of rights
would result, a patient working outwards from the most widely-shared areas of
community morality and its sense of trust. A more frequent and effective
punishing of unjust officials and organizations would help sustain moral
responsibility and perceptions of an accountability." Such safeguards as can
be found should be "capitalized" wherever possible: "public opinion, the
energy of opposition parties [and insurgent organizations], and the consciences
of government officials" for example."17 These are admittedly the frail
safeguards of a limited consensus, but they also revolve around matters of
perception. I have stressed perceptions of costs and benefits in this article
because the perceptions entering into a rational calculus may themselves be
irrational and because perceptions can be changed through education and by
legal and other policies.
106. For example, moral responsibility was reinforced when Governors Blanton of Tennessee,
Kerner of Illinois, and Mandel of Maryland were separately convicted for breaches of the public
trust. These breaches of a fiduciary duty (correlative to the beneficiaries' rights) literally dissipated
legitimacy. See S. BURTON, supra note 61, at 174 and Thompson, supra note 21, at 220, 226.
Establishing an absolute presidential immunity from civil damage suits in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731 (1982), the Supreme Court made it seem as if the king could do no wrong. But the king
had already been driven from office over Watergate immoralities.
A pragmatic morality of rights might combine a Weberian substantive rationality with an
updating of Von lhering's, Cardozo's, and Pigou's social utilitarianism with a human face. See
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMN NATHAN
CARDOZO (1947); A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1962); and E. SCHUR, supra
note 1, at 14, 108. But see R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, for his absolutist notions of principles and
community integrity. A pragmatic morality would assume the need for a great deal of
experimentation, due to scarcities of resources and to competence and uncertainties of expectation.
A rudimentary sense of justice, which even some economists can understand, concerns breaches of
reasonable expectations. See A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1952) and, Posner, Some Uses and Abuses
of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 289 (1979). An inevitable elasticity in what is reasonable
and who gets to define it might, as in contract and tort law, permit the evolution of more-or-less
comprehensible principles of justice.
107. W. MURPHY AND J. TANENHAUS, supra note 7, at 647.
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In the United States and elsewhere, the evidence is massive"c that human
rights will be violated whenever leaders perceive serious threats to political
stability and state strength. Many of these perceptions turn out to be hysterical
overreactions, such as Nixon's and J. Edgar Hoover's. Economics suggests that
only pragmatic appeals to the enlightened self-interest of powerful organizations
and officials will likely protect human rights. Lessons are driven home through
the withdrawals of support and the threats of boycott or rebellion that deplete
resources which officials would like to use in other ways. Enlightenment
involves changing perceptions, so that leaders can read the lessons of history and
understand the fate of those unable or unwilling to do so. The pragmatic appeal
is to the daily exercise of power in ways designed to legitimize and thus to
strengthen that power.
Ideally, the relation between coercion and legitimacy is such that right
makes might and might makes right, in a dialectic of validity and effectiveness
through law." 9 This is what enlightened leaders seek, and it can be used
pragmatically to promote the moral constraints most of us would like to live
108. Brietzke, The Seamy Underside, supra note 8, at 14, 16 n.39. See F. CASTBERG,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE WEST 411-18 (1960). And as Mcllwain points out: "Freedom of
thought and expression and immunity for accused persons from arbitrary detention and from cruel
and abusive treatment...have always been endangered when 'reasons of state' have been thought to
require it." C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 139-40 (1947) (emphasis
supplied).
For American cases supporting the statement in the text, see United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968) (Government's substantial interest in assuring continued availability of draft cards
outweighs first amendment freedom to burn one of these cards); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109 (1959) (no first amendment right to remain silent on conviction for contempt of Congress,
for refusing to disclose possible Communist Party affiliation); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951) (conviction upheld for failure to register party allegedly advocating overthrow of government
by force); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (conviction upheld on failure to obey
statutorily-authorized military order creating concentration camps for Japanese-Americans); EX parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (access to civil courts only guaranteed to citizens, and alleged saboteurs
could thus be tried militarily on President's order). See also Helvering v, Davis, 301 U.S. 619
(1937); Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919) (freedom of speech sacrificed to wartime hysteria); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d
I (D.C. Cir. 1978) (state secrets privilege absolute); United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467
F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (first prior restraint on publication, based on flimsy showing of
danger to national security). But see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (saving rights
through narrow construction of legislation); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1 (1961); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (President's
seizure of steel mills because of strikes during Korean War not justified by emergency); Er parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (after-the-fact invalidation of military tribunal proceeding in area where
civilian courts' functioning unimpaired).
There are, of course, many other restraints on rights which did not spawn leading cases,
including: the Alien and Sedition Act, clandestine spying on domestic insurgents by the CIA, and
FBI Director Hoover's persecution of Martin Luther King.
109. Brietzke, The Seamy Underside, supra note 8, at 26, 61-63.
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under. Unfortunately perhaps, the rational conduct of public affairs requires that
the majority be able to coerce the minority -- subject to the always-limited
constitutional protections designed to forestall the exploitation of minorities. As
Hobbes" ° puts it, "covenants, without the sword, are of no strength to secure
a man at all." The public domain must obviously have enough resources to
override or transform individuals' goals antithetical to the public interest, and
to coordinate and sustain collectively advantageous action."
VIII. CONCLUSION
Coping with and through law, legitimacy, and coercion amounts to plotting
a safe course between injustice and authoritarianism. The voyage should be a
democratic one for, as Reinhold Niebuhr 2 reminds us, "democracy is a
method of finding proximate solutions for insoluble problems." As the
quintessential approximator of solutions, economics has, in its law and
economics guise, found new analytical and political powers. Law and
economics may offer enough insights about the choices, resources, outcomes,
and tradeoffs to be encountered during the voyage that it fulfills one of
Bedau's" 3 meanings of "revolutionary theory": novel, sweeping, and utterly
at variance with prevailing jurisprudential explanations. But in the hands of
some of its practitioners, law and economics seems to have a
counterrevolutionary purpose. A political economy or the institutional
economics of the Progressives may thus prove a more congenial partner for a
liberal jurisprudence, and some of my analyses tend in this direction.
A jurisprudence remains necessary because law and other resources cannot
be used in a circular fashion so as to legitimate their own mode of production.
Ends seldom if ever justify means, especially when an end (efficiency, for
example) is also a means to some other end." 4 It may be that "you can't
110. A. CASSESE, supra note 1, at 86.
111. B. BARNES, supra note 2, at 42, 135, 143.
112. R. NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS 118 (1944).
113. See Bedau, supra note 81, at 67.
114. Robert Unger adds that "the choice among possible views of humanity [including
philosophers' and economists'] is likely to be itself influenced by moral and political perspectives
that cannot be wholly justified by the view one chooses." R. UNGER, supra note 2, at 42.
Likewise, law "upholds a specific kind of order" which is "problematic [and] subject to historically
changing expectations" which require reconstructions and a broader participation and consent. P.
NONET & P. SELZNICK, supra note 1, at 6. The "views of humanity" and resources like law come
together in what Michel Foucault calls "regimes of knowledge," the intersections of knowledge and
power we call academic disciplines - each with its own politics, rewards and punishments. See
Schrag, Liberal Learning in a Posrmodern World, 54(1) (Phi Beta Kappa) KEY REPORTER 1 (1988).
While they may legitimate or delegitimate state power, academics qua academics do not exercise it.
Rubin, supra note 82, at 1870. But as the old joke has it: "I don't need power; I'm a tenured full
professor."
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make an omelette without breaking eggs," but philosophers and social scientists
will want to see the omelette, taste it, and explore the rest of the menu.
Reasonable tastes will differ, but the economist George Stigler"5 has a
sensible last word: criticizing the Interstate Commerce Commission for pro-
railroad policies is like criticizing Giant Foods for selling groceries;
organizations merely do what they are designed to do. If we do not like many
of the outcomes, a new logic of public life is called for. There are many
opportunities for collaboration on this new logic, among economists,
sociologists, lawyers, and others enlightened about each other's methods.
115. Stigler, supra note 7, at 17-18.
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